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  This essay comprises of methodological reflections in honor of Professor 
Ranganath Bharadwaj, written on the occasion of his completing 75 years of a 
truly rich and fulfilling life. There is a distinction between those who merely 
lecture and those who teach. He was a teacher in the true sense of the term. He 
was not so interested in communicating the diagrams and equations perhaps 
because – in his view – that could be construed as an insult to the intelligence of 
the students. He was much more interested in discussing the underpinning and 
the methodological stance in the treatment of particular and specific topics. His 
nuanced one-liners and some critiques dealt with in style have helped many 
others and me and indeed continue to help us evolve as teachers and scholars. 
Non-dogmatic and humorous in his rendering, he has left a un-deli able mark on 
our psyche. On my own part, every time I write something methodological, I find 
a resonance in what Professor Bharadwaj had said at one time or another. His 
impression and impact has been felt by me and others over a period of time. He 
thought and taught us to ‘think out of the box’ when it was not so fashionable. As 
a teacher he did not lead us down the well trodden path but inspired us to have a 
self belief to create our own. For all that he has done to shape my (and that of 





  11. PROLOGUE 
  This is an essay in methodology in the context of economic theory.  Up 
until the recent past one began such a piece with an apology.  Not any more, 
thanks to a whole lot of dedicated work by many first rate economists, 
methodology is now recognized as an important sub-discipline in economics.   
Yet, many an economist to this day feigns disinterest in matters of method.  
Whilst it may be hindrance to start with methodological inquiries/issues to begin 
with, it is positively dangerous to avoid these once a more mature stage has 
been attained by the concerned discipline.  Every once in a while, the practitioner 
must pause collect her bearing and reflect on what one is about.  It is in this spirit 
that the current exercise is undertaken; the devil’s advocate must not only be 
tolerated but indeed encouraged, for, deconstruction must precede a meaningful 
construction.  Further, the concern is almost entirely with theoretical issues.   
Economics – like any other – is a many faceted subject, with each facet of crucial 
importance from a particular angle.  A given paper however needs to be 
delimited and our choice of focus here serves precisely this purpose.   
The role of economic theory in the main is to understand and explain 
economic processes. The explanation must be forthcoming in publicly 
communicable language. In a Wittgensteinian vein, we hold that things that one 
claims to understand one must be able to express in words of a public language.  
After all, whether we consider economists to be practicing a science or a 
discipline, we would all agree that it is not about mysticism or witchcraft!  It may 
be pertinent to note here that to understand and explain does not necessarily 
imply ability to either predict (forecast) or control.  Of course, given that 
many economists are driven by the urge to be useful to the society they may 
require these attributes – ability to provide useful policy inputs – for them to be 
interested in becoming economists in the first place.  Our limited point here is 
that if their theoretical constructs do not yield the means for prediction or 
control economists qua theorists may not be criticized.  For example as 
Frank Hahn has pointed out, that while we reasonably well understand the nature 
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accurately predict or control them.  
  Economists are a breed of story tellers, especially when they are 
theorizing.  This is perhaps as it should be, but when they start telling stories like 
the one about a lady who went to the races and always won, betting on the horse 
with the shortest tail, even the suspended disbelief gets strained.  The plot may 
be complex and logically tight but the one important feature that a relevant story 
must have is the characteristic of plausibility.  Otherwise it will simply fail to 
persuade.  In putting together these stories, some assumptions are naturally 
required.  One such assumption of considerable importance is that of rationality, 
whose extensiveness, limitations and indeed substance I propose to look into in 
the present essay.  The assumption of rationality on the part of economic agents 
is a convenient working assumption.  This implies that it is not assumed that 
everyone is always rational, further there are no normative undertones either, 
i.e., it is not assumed that everyone ought to be rational.  What the assumption 
simply means is that if agents are not rational then economists qua economists 
can proceed very little by way of analysis.  There is one final caveat that needs to 
be entered before I get down to business proper. The rationality that one is 
referring to is what is termed as procedural or instrumental rationality.  Thus 
whereas the preferences are over an outcome space and hence about ends as it 
were, there is some distance to go for attaining those ends.  Depending on the 
context there is little or much theory and computation required in the selection of 
strategic means towards these ends. There are of course some other ways in 
which rationality has been looked at by such important philosophers as 
Habermas, Weber and Kant. Yet others like Hume and Keynes have sought to 
explain the essential driving force for action in the realm of ‘passion’ and ‘animal 
spirits’ respectively. Even then I am talking in the domain of theory.  In order to 
pass from this domain to the real world application there is a further 
correspondence principle – made famous by Paul Samuelson – to be sorted out.  
Let me now delve into the layers of the substantive meaning of rationality.  In 
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then on to more complex one. 
 
2. CORE 
  The core of this paper deals with – explains and analyzes – the various 
attempts made by economists to model the rational economic person.  The 
treatment is successively complicated and complex. Starting from static, perfect/ 
complete information situation, we introduce dynamic elements and then 
uncertainty in its various aspects.  I then go on to elaborate the ‘revolutionary’ 
response of the mainstream economists viz., that of rational expectations.  The 
explanation is interspersed with critical comments and shortcomings.  In the later 
sections I have tried to highlight the role of culture and nature of social reality 
especially as it differs from physical reality.  It ends with a very brief discussion of 
the Penrose critique of AI (Artificial Intelligence). 
 
2.1 RATIONALITY : MARK ONE 
Let us begin at the beginning, with the basic structure of any economic 
problem.  Economics is about choice which at the very least must presume 
comparability.  Unfortunately, an agent typically faces a set of decision objects, 
which does not have the property of complete or linear order.   In other words the 
decision objects are heterogeneous in character. One thus requires a 
transformation from the set of decision objects to one which is linearly ordered 
set.  This allows us to put tags onto the objects between whom we must take a 
choice.  Given the underlying preference structure, the consequent utility function 
(which presumably is to be maximized) and the budget constraint, one can now 
make the actual choice.  In symbols, economic problem is about a search for a 
functional: ϕ : R
n → R.  In a word, we are looking essentially for a dotting vector.  
As an aside, I may mention that this position is implicitly assuming linearity of 
processes. Of course, one knows of chaotic and catastrophic processes to 
prevail in reality. Whilst I will have a few comments to make later about such 
complications, I will choose to simply take refuge behind the fact that we do not 
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terms of diagnostics nor identification. So to return to our simpler theme: 
economics then is importantly concerned with the evolution and the 
characteristics of such a dotting vector.  The study must encompass the manifold 
ways in which such a vector come about.  It could be derived as a price thrown 
up by an institution of market or it could be purely subjective and yet again it may 
represent the solution to the dual problem of a standard activity analysis problem 
treated as a primal.  The point is that – however it may come about – without 
such a valuation mechanism one cannot hope to take even the first step in the 
arena of economic analysis. Values then enter on the ground floor of economics.  
Let me hasten to add that whilst this implies that it is mandatory on the part of an 
analyst to make these clear, it does not in any way reduce the importance or the 
scientific character of economics.  Economics is thus built implicitly around a 
value loaded theory of rationality.  I however do not agree with Hausman when 
he opines that the theory of rationality is essentially normative. After all, the tools 
of analysis are one thing, the use to which one may put them, is quite another. 
The formulation is rather simple in a static world with full information and 
in a Robinson Crusoe type of an economy to give a substantial meaning to the 
concept of rationality.  But, this does not get us very far, for, this simply is a false 
start.  I will argue that except for classificatory, definitional or taxonomic purposes 
or indeed for pedagogic or purposes of elucidating principles in the abstract, this 
approach is not very useful. Economic analysis requires that we situate the 
economic agent within a society with its historically evolved and evolving 
institutions.  This as I shall note later, requires that socio-economic analysis 
cannot be a-historical and must be dynamic.  This way of viewing things sets off 
myriad questions all pretty thorny but crucial and hence must be faced. 
To begin with there is very little meaning that one can give to a one-
person ‘society’.  This implies that whether it is the problem of choosing between 
picking berries or catching fish (static optimization between alternative 
consumption bundles) or the problem of catching fish with hand or investing in 
the construction of a net (the inter-temporal dynamic optimization), it is 
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her preferences, the problem juxtaposes the individual against ‘nature’.  It cannot 
legitimately be in the domain of social science inquiry, which must concern itself 
with the relationship of a person with another.  Given the data such a problem is 
easily solved ‘algorithmically’ and the computational requirements for the solution 
are not very stiff. It is also relatively simple then to specify the utility function of 
the individual too.  This is most succinctly thought of within the Marxian 
distinction of wealth creation and value creation.  Whilst the first is undoubtedly 
important, the latter alone can legitimately fall within the domain of interest of a 
social scientist. 
As we shall see later even this problem becomes rather messy when we 
concern ourselves with the individual situated in the historically evolved social 
substructures, such as the family, for then even the specification of the self is not 
straight forward. I may venture to suggest that an individual in a social situation 
assumes a membership of several loose groupings simultaneously that may form 
a relevant set for specific decisions. This can be modeled by using theory and 
tools of fuzzy sets/ analysis. A fuzzy set represents fluidity where the traditional 
set represents solidity. Formally, a fuzzy set is a function from a set X to a 
compact set (normalized as a zero-one interval). Membership of each fuzzy set 
within a nested family (individual qua individual, qua member of a family, nation, 
human race etc) creates a complexity that we referred to above as the 
‘identification of the self. The complication then arises out of different magnitudes 
of strengths that have a bearing on the decision making by the self does not help/ 





2.2 RATIONALITY ; MARK TWO 
Let me begin to complicate things a bit.  This I do here by creating more 
than one Robinson Crusoes and putting them all together in a group to form a 
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insight into why I use the prefix ‘quasi’ in the previous sentence. Clearly a society 
(even from the point of view of realism in modeling) is not a haphazard throwing 
together of a few Robinson Crusoes; they are together ‘bound ‘ by some – 
however loose – historically conditioned and evolved institutional relationships.   
Be that as it may, even in this ‘simple’ contrived set up, things get rather 
complicated even if keeps ‘production’ out and considers only the exchange 
economy.  First of all, there need to evolve institutions like ‘markets’ where 
contracts may be reached.  Further, either functionally distinct supervisory bodies 
are required or else incentive compatibility has to be built into the design of 
contracts for them to be actually implementable.  Since Maxwell’s demon one 
has known that information is not free and search thus implies costs.  In taking 
rational decisions then one is bound to take into account the omnipresent costs. 
The way I have set up things here (with identical replicas of agent types) 
there are two implicit assumptions that are usually made.  One is about the 
common knowledge rationality (CKR). This means that the rationality is not only 
practiced, but indeed this fact is common knowledge with respect for other 
agent’s rationality. This leads to one of the most enduring and important 
concepts of equilibrium, viz., that of Nash equilibrium.  Common knowledge 
rationality is not sufficient to justify Nash equilibrium since people must form 
same probability of assessment about hat is likely to happen, when they go to 
work with same information.  This leads to the relevance (non trivial) of the 
assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, but the further 
complications and elaboration will be seen later, especially when I introduce 
‘culture’.  This further leads us to the other assumption that is about consistent 
alignment of beliefs.  This implies that the fact that different agents are identical 
stretches right through to their belief structures.  They are destined to act and 
react in exact same fashion.  Thus, common alignment of beliefs means that no 
instrumentally rational agent can expect another similarly rational agent, who has 
the same information to develop different thought process. This leads to 
rationalization of Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies as well.  Clearly, this 
  7imposes homogeneity on agents that is stifling.  A little reflection will convince 
one that these are horribly constraining assumptions.  The macro system here is 
merely the microcosm uniformly reduced or expanded.  The only diversity here 
can be rationalized in the form of incomplete (asymmetric) information structures 
of agents.  Surely this is not enough, but since I am proceeding slowly, let me 
first introduce complications that arise due to dynamics and uncertainty.  Whilst 
both these are independent sources of complications, together they pose rather 
formidable problems.     
 
2.3 RATIONALITY: MARK THREE     
  From what I have said so far, it should be clear that dynamics is crucial to 
realistic conceptualization of the economic problem.  In the mainstream 
economics Roy Harrod introduced the agenda for providing limbs of economic 
dynamics, when he perceptively observed that static and dynamic are two 
distinct modes in the sense of being birds of different feathers.  Dynamic analysis 
requires a different way of thinking and as Harrod showed in his ‘knife edge 
problem’, leads to startlingly counterintuitive results.  The problem here which is 
a cousin of the static constrained optimization problem, requires a higher order of 
computational effort. The dynamic optimization whether viewed in the 
Pontryagin frame or that of Bellman leads one to solve the problem backwards.  
The actual solution method involving the ‘cost to go’ approach, the storage 
(stacking) of Riccati equations and the extraction of the feedback rule need not 
hold us here.  Thus, life here is understood backwards, unfortunately it must be 
lived forward.  The important fall out of dynamic analysis is that expectations 
become important.  Once expectations are important, one cannot very well keep 
mistakes (out of equilibrium actions) out.  I shall only note this here and elaborate 
on the economists’ response to this challenge in the next section and my critique 
thereof in the subsequent ones. 
  It is evident that underlying any (rational) choice is an implicit or an explicit 
decision model. Given that the relations in economics are inexact, the 
‘realizations’ of model equations are estimated or are econometric in nature.   
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constraints on data availability amongst other things.  These uncertainties take 
different forms and are of different magnitudes and need to be taken into account 
in different ways.  Rational decisions in such an environment represents a higher 
level of difficulty as far as conception as well as computation is concerned.  In 
technical language, there is the system noise or the additive uncertainty, the 
estimated parameter noise or the multiplicative uncertainty and then there is the 
measurement noise.  Fortunately, it is not only possible to acknowledge these 
uncertainties but indeed to incorporate the magnitudinal aspects of these in 
analysis. Continuing computational advances have thrown up various techniques 
for which user friendly codes have been written and are available. The Kalman 
Filtering and Stochastic Control techniques are quite popular and represent a 
useful addition to the tool-kit of a professional economist.  The realistic and 
hence useful work in this area is still in its infancy and much more work by way of 
Monte Carlo simulations with different models, as well as numerical treatment of 
non-gaussian distributions remains to be done, but the good news is that the 
work has begun.  This will allow us to get an insight into the links between the 
patterns of uncertainties and the most efficient algorithm, such as the certainty 
equivalence, or passive learning or active learning that should be used.  My 
hunch here is that analytical tools in this area have for the moment reached their 
saturation point and a real advance in this area will come through computational 
advance and efforts (the work of David Kendrick and Hans Amman is particularly 
important and should be to be followed closely).  
 
 
2.4. RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS: AVOIDING THORNY ISSUES   
  As a response to the various criticisms vis-à-vis the non-existence of an 
acceptable expectations frame which is so crucial in the treatment of dynamics, 
as also the search for micro foundations, the mainstream economists (neo-
classical, if one cares for labels) proposed the rational expectations hypothesis 
(REH).  Muth’s early work was taken as a beginning point.  The hypothesis was 
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mistakes.  The crucial question then ought to have been about how agents learn 
about the underlying model representing reality that generates correct forecasts.  
However, if it is assumed that agents somehow learn the underlying model, the 
optimality properties of the REH can be easily verified.  REH can be taken to 
imply that the subjective conditional distribution of some random variable 
coincides with its objective conditional distribution.  It is no surprise that the 
property of being unbiased and best was crucial in endearing the REH, 
particularly to the applied economists.  The Ratexian analysis works on the 
assumption that a true structure always exists for a given economy.  The 
economy is modeled as being away from the true structure but tending towards it 
at any given point of time.  The procedure then is to specify the most general 
form of equations, including the error correction term.  The true structure thus 
simply needs to be identified.  It is generally assumed to be characterized by 
stable parameter values and a white noise error process.  The Ratexians thus fall 
into the category of positivist school, which seeks to validate models by their 
ability to provide accurate forecasts. 
  In sharp distinction to this, Keynesian practice was concerned with 
disequilibrium in a fundamental sense.  There is no presumption of a ‘true’ model 
that just needed identification.  In fact, most Keynesians would deny that true 
structural models ever exist for an economy (in the a priori sense), a view 
reinforced by recent research on sunspot models.  This view, I may note is also 
close to the view of the present paper.  Thus, Keynesian approach (especially 
econometric modeling) looks for ‘good approximations’.  Theories are just 
approximate representations of the real world and are confronted with data for 
the purposes of uncovering macroeconomic regularities.  Of course, this method 
has inherent in it the possibility of multiple model / equations representation.   
This however is not looked upon as something undesirable, since it is believed 
that there is no ‘one given and certain’ interpretation of truth. 
  The Ratexian models that are advocated, on the other hand, use the 
Arrow-Debreu ‘contingent claims model’ in an essential way.  They are basically 
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disequilibrium and learning.  Such models, ‘small analogue economies’ are 
supposed to be useful ways of carrying out experiments that would be costly in 
the real world.  As Lucas puts it, “the central idea is that individual responses can 
be documented cheaply….’.  This indeed is the much maligned method of ‘casual 
empiricism’ or simply keeping your eyes open. However to formulate such 
models not of isolated Robinson Crusoes but of entire economies, a theory of 
group behavior is clearly needed.  This issue is avoided by the contrivance of the 
so called ‘representative agent’ about which I shall have something to say a bit 
later.   
  It is clear that rational expectations hypothesis requires agents to know 
the true model underlying the economy.  This means that agents either already 
know or are able to learn the true model over time.  While it is true that rational 
agents learn from mistakes, it is not clear why such learning should lead them to 
rational expectations equilibria (REE).  One would have thought that out of 
equilibrium beliefs and learning from mistakes would form a major agenda fir 
ratexians.  These issues have been largely ignored and only recently some work 
has been done in this area.   The results are not very clear and as Pesaran has 
pointed out, all these models assume that the agents know about the true 
relationships in the economy, but do not explain how the agents learn about 
these relationships in the first place.  In response to the criticism that agents here 
are akin to the super efficient automata, an alternative strategy has been used, 
that of modeling ‘boundedly’ rational learning.  Here the agents are not required 
to know the relations but they are expected to follow a plausible learning rule to 
which they remain committed throughout the learning period. But this is 
problematic because since the rule is not a closed feed-back one, the 
commitment of part of agents implicitly assumes an extra modular knowledge the 
source of which is unexplained. 
  Let me now say a few things about the contrivance of ‘representative 
agent’, which irons out the heterogeneity in a macro set up.  Now, macro 
economic outcomes are a result of the co ordination and interaction between 
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collection of channels through which agents interact, the ‘analogue economy’ 
school makes the short cut assumption of a representative agent (for a good 
measure of pedigree they cite the example of Alfred Marshall’s representative 
firm). A hypothetical representative agent is assumed, whose actions are 
deemed synonymous with the macro-economy’s responses.  Thus, 
macroeconomic activity, rather than being seen as a result of interplay between 
agents’ actions is seen as mean-aggregative microeconomics.  No serious 
thought has been given to verify if such a short cut is indeed validly possible.  
One way of rationalizing the representative agent is to look at the individual as 
mimicking the aggregate, with the implication that the aggregate made up of 
several optimizing agents, itself ‘behaves’ like an optimizing agent.  There is no 
formal justification for this.  Indeed, this argument involves the fallacy of 
composition.  Individual rationality – as is well known – does not engender 
collective rationality.  A very simple example of this is the Prisoner’s dilemma.  
Thus, unless one wants to risk the position of individual foundationalism (more on 
this in the next sub-section), such models ought not to be used.  They yield no 
useful insight theoretically and they are positively dangerous when used for 
policy formulation.  Of course there is further shortcoming in that, all 
considerations of distribution, as well as response diversity are ruled out by 
definition.  It is in this context that consideration of culture becomes relevant. 
 
2.5 CULTURE: THE CRUCIAL PARAMETRIC ENVIRONMENT  
At a general level, one can conceive of an agent being faced with an 
objective function and has to face certain constraints.   The agent must then 
compute the optimal action.  The way the agent perceives her objective function 
and constraints as also the strategy set available to her is importantly determined 
by an interpretation filter.  This filter is conditioned by the conceptual frame.  The 
conceptual frame – in the socio-political-economic-milieu is a complex of folklore, 
psychology and ideology.  It is this which I term ‘culture’.  There is a dialectics of 
sorts that is going on between the perception and conception, for after all, as 
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perception is empty’.  It is in this context that culture assumes a crucial role in 
shaping the parametric environment.  It enters the situation in several ways.  In 
the first place, the formulation of the objective function is culturally conditioned.  
Further the interpretative mechanism is a product of specific historico-
sociological experiences.  Thus, the very consciousness is a reflection of the 
socially learnt traits.  The next step of computation of the optimal action, involves 
in the first instance the transformation from ‘what is to be done’ to ‘how to do it’.  
The tools-of-computation as well as the relevant strategy-set depends rather 
heavily on the social norms. 
Economic theory however makes relatively little use of this concept.  The 
term culture, as Max Steur put it, quite simply is used to refer to that part of agent 
behaviour unconsciously imitating the conscious or the unconscious examples 
and experiences of the surrounding society.  Here the stable co-existence of 
fundamentally different modes of learning is a very real possibility.  This is in 
direct conflict with the mainstream assumptions of common knowledge rationality 
(CKR) and common alignment of beliefs (CAB) with the imposition of 
homogeneity.  Realistic analysis must allow for many stories and should not 
impose imperative of uniform-indeed identical-types.  The homogeneity 
postulate, the representative agent come into serious question and the very 
substance of the meaning of optimality and hence of rationality becomes a 
contingent category. 
Culture then, leads to the reduction of strategy sets open to an agent in a 
given society.  The reduction that I am referring to here is not the standard 
reduction on the basis of dominance principle.  That is allowed even within the 
mainstream framework and retains only the ‘rationalisable’ or ‘worthwhile’ 
strategies.  One knows that this kind of reduction leads to the solution 
equivalence with the original game.  On the other hand, the reduction that I am 
hinting at is ‘norm based’.  Obviously here there is no necessity for the solution 
equivalence with the original game to be preserved.  The other way in which 
‘culture’ would enter is with reference to the different speeds of learning which 
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Culture allows for heterogeneity which is inter as well as intra temporal in nature.  
Thus different agents would use different algorithms (of differing levels of 
sophistication and hence costs) for computing their strategies.  Also, the same 
agent may use different algorithms to solve different components of a macro 
problem that she faces. 
Having looked, all too briefly, at the way in which culture importantly 
enters the scheme of things, let me now return to the theme of ‘foundationalism’ 
implicit in retexian analysis.  Foundationalism allows economists to rule out 
irreconcilable inter-agent differences. There is no scope for different ‘sign 
systems’ to exist simultaneously and stably.  Their existence will be seen as an 
error which will be ironed out for only one of them is ‘correct’. Indeed, 
conceptual differences are seen as differences of perception arising out of 
asymmetric or incomplete information. The presumption that there is only one 
story has lead to the famous result which goes under the name of Harsanyi-
Aumann doctrine or the startlingly simplistic theorem that ‘rational agents 
cannot agree to disagree’. A critique of foundationalism and the related position 
of the ontological individualist, from a hermeneutical point of view has been 
advanced. This is the handiwork of mainly the sociologists and cultural 
anthropologists. They have debated questions between the relation between 
parts and the whole which is of great relevance to us.  This naturally is related to 
our view of social reality. It is to this that I now turn. 
 
2.6 NATURE OF SOCIAL REALITY : IMPLICATIONS FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE 
A discussion and criticism of foundationalism, leads one to the question of 
the very understanding of the relevant reality as also to the micro-macro debate 
in the context of economics.  Whilst macro phenomena depend on micro reality 
they do have a statistical existence of their own.  Of course one need not 
subscribe to the extreme position of Comte, that aggregate (macro) reality has an 
independent existence of its own.  The position of the ontological individualist 
cannot be completely negated.  Rather the difference between the two realities 
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the individual behavior, the answer comes in terms of intentions.  However one 
cannot get a similar answer when one poses a question about the existence of 
an institution at the macro level.  Here the answer has only an implicational 
connotation.  There are any number of such examples in economics (say that of 
the existence of money).  An attempt to understand the whole in terms of 
intentionally acting individuals will lead us astray.  The crucial distinction between 
intentional and implicational behavior parallels the micro and macro behavior.   
Further this leads to a distinction between the substantive content of rationality 
associated with the intentional behavior and that which is attached to behavior 
which is only implicational in nature.  To elaborate in a word, in analyzing social 
institutions, many a time, intentional rationality is applied and optimality inferred.  
This is clearly wrong headed and incorrect, for the existence of institutions may 
come about due to historical accidents.  For their perpetuation what is required is 
not their optimality but that they be not completely detrimental to the existence of 
the system in which they exist.  Thus a tolerable viability, given that the 
institutions already exist is what can legitimately be inferred.  The only formal 
concept currently in the tool-kit of the economists that comes close to being 
useful for such analysis appears to me to be that of evolutionary equilibrium in 
Game Theory as modified by Kaushik Basu.  Let me leave this discussion here 
for continuing in this vein will lead us far a-field and more into specific economic 
propositions.   
One basic tenet of the practice of social scientists, especially in the 
context of economics has been the practice of monism.  This has implied that – 
as I have already noted – homogeneity is imposed on the agents’ behaviour that 
is modelled, economists have looked to physical or natural scientists for 
inspiration and imitation as far as tools of analysis are concerned.  This, 
notwithstanding the fact that Von Neumann so long ago, in formulating the theory 
of games had noted that the underlying problem is qualitatively different from that 
faced by the natural scientists.  The two branches of inquiry fundamentally differ 
in may ways and yet the practice of scientists has not reflected this.  One 
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intelligent systems.  Apart from the inability to conduct controlled experiments, 
this has implied that analysis and the announcements of propositions have the 
capacity to influence the agent behavior that is being analyzed.  The act of 
observation and analysis of the subject matter has the power to change that 
which is being analyzed.  To give an example, which clarifies the distinction 
between social and natural sciences one is hinting at, one knows that plants 
orientate their leaves to expose maximum leaf surface to sunlight.  Yet, one does 
not feel the need to put the question as ‘why do plants behave in this way?’  
Thus, despite the fact that the optimizing behavior on the part of plants may be 
computed by the scientists, there is not connotation of intentionality attached. 
In the case of physical sciences, the concept of truth is very often related to 
discoveries.  Even in case of inventions the nature of truth is conceived as being 
‘something out there’ waiting to be uncovered or perceived.  In contrast, when it 
comes to social sciences, it relates to ‘the consistency of the property of 
propositions’. Social reality then is to be construed as a meta (becoming) 
concept.  This opens up the possibility (inevitability) of our (priors) belief 
structures influencing (posteriors) what will come about.  The way to think about 
this is the familiar Gidden’s concept of structuration. This incorporates the 
important idea that action and structures are mutually constituted in the practices 
of society. All this leads to several important implications for situating social 
science research. 
Traditionally, economists have been involved in the bottom-up activity of 
aggregating micro into macro economic propositions. Now I intend to say 
something about the process by putting it on its head.  I stress this here because 
it is far less (indeed not at all) recognized. Macroeconomic research propositions, 
whether true (valid) or not have the power to create sunspots which feed into 
agents’ micro behavior via their expectational frames.  How then do the agents 
learn or derive expectational content from the received macro propositions?  My 
conjecture is, not unlike the learning by children.  Social learning of technical 
economic propositions never goes beyond the first stages of Piaget’s scheme.  It 
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social context is culture constrained, taking place through fables and simple 
morals.  Though there is a tacit recognition of the complex nature of things, at the 
operational level, anecdotes and fables are what survive as simple learned 
truths.  These are historically reinforced by associations thrown up by casual 
empiricism.  Cultural constraints and belief formation then become central to the 
whole process of expectations formation which feed into the micro behavior and 
indeed provide the parametric environment for rationality.  There is increasing 
realization that belief formation needs to be endogenised and that ignoring them 
is illegitimate as economists have finally woken up to the importance of self 
fulfilling beliefs and sunspots.  One interesting and pertinent interpretation of 
sunspots is that they provide a signaling device that co-ordinates actions and 
also work as a randomization device to convexify opportunity sets.  All this leads 
to pluralism of possible outcomes a fact that economists are uneasy about.  One 
can only hope that they realize that the fault lies in their insisting on 
understanding even the macro phenomena in an ontological vein (which they 
hope will lead to uniqueness) rather than interpreting and accepting them in an 
existentialist spirit. 
Let me now briefly touch upon the Penrose critique of the AI and its 
possible implication for practice of economics.  One of the central themes of the 
Penrose critique has been to argue that by use of our consciousness we are 
enabled to perform action that lie beyond any kind of computational activity.  This 
goes strongly against the commonly held view point that our conscious mentality, 
- in all its various manifestations – could, in principle, be fully understood in terms 
of computational models.  The conclusion is that conscious thinking must indeed 
involve ingredients that cannot even be simulated adequately by mere 
computation, still less could computation, of itself alone, evoke any conscious 
feeling or intentions.  Understanding is after all what science is about – and 
science is a great deal more than mindless computation.  Penrose strongly 
contends that an essential ingredient is missing from our present-day scientific 
picture.  This missing ingredient would be needed in order that the central issues 
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world view.  This consciousness is of course not held to be beyond science, but 
the scientific endeavor needs to be appropriately expanded so as to bring it 
within its realm.  Otherwise science would fall profoundly short of pretension to 
completeness.  Thus, if one poses the two extremes, one which holds that all 
consciousness is appropriate computation and the other that consciousness is 
beyond the pale of any computation or science, then obviously the last 
mentioned view has to be discarded.  For, that would lead us to mysticism.                             
  It should be obvious to the discerning, that my position in this paper is 
close to the Penrose position.  Of course, no one in the right frame of mind would 
hold that consciousness is about mindless  computation.  The important 
difference between our positions is that whereas Penrose is looking into the 
internal processes (in the small)  and contending that one needs to expand the 
scientific scope for the quantum transition from computation to consciousness, I 
hold that economic science must expand to accommodate the parametric 
environment (culture) so as to analyze the appropriate computation.  Whilst the 
precise physio-psychological processes are important and must form an integral 
part of the unified theory such a construction must await another day.  Even apart 
from that there is an important missing link in the current practice of economics 
which I have tried to highlight as being rather more urgent and crucial for relevant 
theorizing.  
 
3.  EPILOGUE  
  And now I am done.  In this piece, I have tried to critically look at the 
modeling of the rational economic person as per the current professional 
practice.  I have argued that the simplest situation of static – complete 
information scenario presents no great difficulty in conceptual or computational 
terms.  Here a caveat needs to be entered.  Even in a deterministic situation, 
chaotic dynamics does present considerable complexity. This leads to 
unpredictability and being information non-preserving in nature no learning is 
possible.  The fact that it is extremely sensitive to initial conditions poses further 
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phenomenon and so hopefully will not be encountered too often. 
  My argument has been that static situation as a beginning point for 
economic analysis is a false start.  The primary myth of economic analysis must 
be an individual situated in a society with its specific historical institutions.  This 
means that a-historical analysis is no good.  Also dynamic considerations are of 
prime importance.  I have tried to show how dynamics on one hand and 
uncertainty on the other lead to conceptual and computational difficulties of a 
higher order.  Fortunately the computational prowess has grown due to the 
tremendous advances in computational technology and that is good news.  I 
have then looked at the neo-classical response by way of rational expectations. 
  The main problem with rational expectations is that they do not make clear 
the sources of extra modular knowledge on the part of agents that they assume.  
Further, they impose homogeneity by assuming that ‘there is only one story’.  
Inspite of acknowledging the fact that even with rational expectations, mistakes 
are possible, no attempt is made to seriously develop a theory of individual or 
group learning. The entire crucial issue is bypassed by remaining within the 
realm of steady state.  This conforms to the tenet of ‘searching for pin under the 
light’.  Also, Ratexian approach is riddled with individual fondationalism arising 
out of the contrivance of the so called ‘representative agent’ which never allows 
one to come to terms with either modeling the whole (macro) system or to work 
out its relevance to the micro level decision frame.  It is in this context that I have 
advocated the importance of ‘culture’.  I have tried to present the different 
channels through which it enters the substantive make up of reality.  I have also 
argued that consciousness is conceived and hence perceived organically through 
the filter of ‘culture’.   
  In looking at the social reality, I have implicitly argued that society is not so 
many Robin Crusoes thrown together, but they are bound together and should be 
seen in the context of structuration.  The meta nature of social reality implies that 
belief structures are important given the self-fulfilling prophecies, bubbles and 
sunspots. The interactive dynamics or a theory of group behavior is clearly 
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Computational considerations are important, but in the context of social norms, 
there may be ‘leader follower’ relations.  After all, there are any numbers of 
illustrations from revolutionary action to the realm of theosophy or the 
entrepreneurial actions in economics where individual actions take place not 
necessarily as a result of computation but either as learned social behavior or of 
passion or indeed animal spirits, not to mention ideological praxis. In any case 
relevant research agenda in economics – I believe – must be based on a 
meaningful dialectics between the pure theorist and empiricist.  The current 
professional agenda is too engrossed with analytical refinement project which I 





  This piece has been written in an essay format.  Thus, there are no 
references provided.  The interested person may refer to the relevant essays in 
an earlier published monograph: TEACHING THEORY AND PRACTICE 
ECONOMICS: Essays in Methodology, Indian Economic Association Trust for 
Research Development, New Delhi 1996.  Those interested are also encouraged 
to read the new classic, EMPEROR’S NEW MIND and the more recent 
SHADOWS OF THE MIND, both by Roger Penrose, published by Oxford 
University Press. 
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